cover image: A Recursive Core for Cooperative Games with Overlapping Coalitions /

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A Recursive Core for Cooperative Games with Overlapping Coalitions /

31 Oct 2014

This is, in the event that a coalition of players deviates from a prescribed agreement, the payoff they expect to obtain depends on the way the remaining (residual) players react to the deviation.1 Different extensions lean towards one way or another to model the behaviour of such residual players, leading to the α− and β−core (Aumann and Peleg, 1960), the ω−core (Shenoy, 1979), the δ−core (d’Aspr [...] We first follow the tradition in cooperative game theory, defining the set of residual players as the com- plement of the set of a deviant coalition. [...] To the best of our knowledge, Boehm (1973) is the first to study the endogenous formation of overlapping coalitions structures in the light of his general equilibrium model, followed by Myerson 2 A reader who is interested in the difference between notions of the core will find an interesting overview in Hafalir (2007). [...] This paper differs from all the previous ones because it is the first to develop an extension of the recursive core, and consequently the coalition structure core, to the setting of overlapping coalitions. [...] With our devotion to keep the tradition in cooperative game theory by defining the residual game on the complement of the set of the deviant coalition, we miss a subtle consistency requirement.
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Pages
19
Published in
Sherbrooke, QC, CA

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